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Abstract 
This paper looks at three key cases; UsedSoft (C-458/13), PC Box (C-355/12) and 
Grund (C-458/13), on the topic of the extent and nature of a copyright holders ability 
to constrain future uses of their copyrighted works in the field of software and 
critically considers the interaction between copyright and competition law in these 
judgements.  
In UsedSoft, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter CJEU) shook the 
common-law world by suggesting that under certain circumstances the licensing of a 
piece of software could constitute a sale, they achieved this by focusing on the 
balance of right between the user and the vendor and more importantly, on the 
“specific subject matter” of the right granted. 
 In PC Box, a more economically cautious judgement, but one with intellectual 
consonance with UsedSoft, the CJEU looked at the issue of 'modchips' to permit 
homebrew and other non-approved games to be played on Nintendo consoles. They 
decided that the TPM (technological protection measures) embedded in the consoles 
were analogous to the other more traditional methods of encryption and DRM (digital 
rights management) employed in standard software. However, the judgement also 
highlighted that the use of a balancing test with regard to the appropriateness of the 
TPM devices in consoles was necessary.  Furthermore, the Court judged that the 
national courts should carry out a 'real world' market test to see if the use of modchips 
truly adversely affected the interests of the copyright holder i.e. how of then they were 
used for infringing as opposed to non-infringing uses. 
Finally, we shall consider the key case that never was - Grund. This case was, and 
remains, something of an enigma as the preliminary reference questions were difficult 
to comprehend but nevertheless promised important clarifications in the law. 
However, we will consider it in this discussion largely because the reference was 
ultimately withdrawn because the parties were convinced that the issue was resolved 
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by the judgement in PC Box. Thus it offers an insight into the future utility of the 
UsedSoft and PC Box judgements. 
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Introduction 
This paper begins with an examination of the relationship between copyright and competition 
law and then considers a triptych of landmark cases from the ECJ and posits the hypothesis 
that they are indicative of a piecemeal attempt to ameliorate the effects of copyright by 
strengthening the competition law aspects of the jurisprudence interpreting copyright. 
Finally, we shall consider if these ameliorations by way of 'lex specialis' and innovative 
teleological interpretations are sufficient to achieve this aim or if a clearer, less complex 
statement of principle is required.  
 
Copyright and Competition in EU Law: A Complex Interplay 
Traditionally, at its most basic level, the demarcation between copyright and competition law 
is that copyright provides ex ante regulation of the use of goods. Its rules and rights are 
embedded in the legal system and therefore are comparatively certain and slow to change. 
Competition on the other hand provides ex post regulation which is responsive to market 
conditions and hinges around the prevention of abuse of dominant position to limit 
competition as outlined in Article 102 TFEU.
1
  
If properly understood however, this is not a collision of regulatory systems but an active 
collusion. It is the contention of this paper that recent decisions in the field of intellectual 
property are in fact relying on ideas from competition law. The first transplanted concept is 
the principle of specific subject matter (as we shall see in UsedSoft) which defines the nature 
and extent of an IPR. The second concerns the application of the principles behind Article 
102, in particular the idea of “exercising an intellectual property in an abusive fashion”. Thus, 
the introduction of market share tests whilst relatively innovative in IP, has a strong pedigree 
in the field of competition and our consideration of PC Box shall highlight the resonances 
between the decision in that case and the history and jurisprudence of Article 102. 
 
1: Oracle v UsedSoft 
Oracle is a licensor of software, of which a large proportion is obtained through download. 
The terms of its licence are that, for a one-off fee, the customer receives a “non-exclusive, 
non-transferable” right to use the software “exclusively for [the customer‟s] internal business 
purposes and for an unlimited period”. Oracle also provides maintenance services subject to 
payment of periodic fees. UsedSoft is a German company selling 'used' licences of Oracle 
software (where the maintenance services agreement was still on-going). The buyers of these 
'used licences' then download the software directly from Oracle. 
Oracle sought an injunction to prevent this practice claiming that its copyright was infringed. 
UsedSoft counter-claimed that Oracle‟s rights in the copyright protecting the software were 
exhausted following the download and that UsedSoft‟s actions amounted to distribution 
(permitted under the Software Directive (2009/24/EC)). 
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The decision in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Case C-128/11 (Oracle v 
UsedSoft) on a reference from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) decided 3 July 2012 
(hereafter UsedSoft) is essentially a tale of the interpretation of two directives. On the one 
hand the Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC which states that: 
(Recital 28) Copyright protection under this Directive includes the exclusive right 
to control distribution of the work incorporated in a tangible article. The first sale 
in the Community of the original of a work or copies thereof by the rightholder or 
with his consent exhausts the right to control resale of that object in the 
Community. This right should not be exhausted in respect of the original or of 
copies thereof sold by the rightholder or with his consent outside the 
Community... 
(Recital 29) The question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and 
on-line services in particular. This also applies with regard to a material copy of a 
work or other subject-matter made by a user of such a service with the consent of 
the rightholder...
2
 
Furthermore, the Information Society Directive also makes it clear that the rights to 
communication cannot be exhausted and the right of distribution cannot be exhausted except 
by first sale with consent. 
On the other hand Article 4(2) of the Software Directive 2009/24/EC clearly states: 
The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the rightholder or with 
his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the Community of that 
copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental of the program or a 
copy thereof.
3
 
Thus, the question becomes, is software licensed for use when it is downloaded by a 
subscriber for use, or is it sold? The traditional response based, in part at least, upon the 
intangible nature of the product is that it is licensed not sold and therefore rights exhaustion 
cannot apply and the licensee will be bound by the conditions laid down by the licensor. 
Indeed this position is so ingrained that many common law lawyers in particular have 
criticised the UsedSoft judgement and worked hard to explain away its meaning and 
importance by labelling it a fact-specific aberration.
4
 
In UsedSoft, however, the CJEU takes a step away from this situation. They assert that 
Article 4(2) of the Software Directive is an autonomous concept and they create a special and 
distinct meaning for it which they then apply to the facts of this case to find that a transfer of 
use for value for an unlimited period constitutes a sale. Furthermore, they state: 
It makes no difference, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, 
whether the copy of the computer program was made available to the customer by 
                                                          
2
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the rightholder concerned by means of a download from the rightholder's website 
or by means of a material medium such as a CD-ROM or DVD.
5
 
Finally, they echo the opinion of the Advocate General in asserting that: 
 
...if the term 'sale' within the meaning of art 4(2) of Directive 2009/24 were not 
given a broad interpretation as encompassing all forms of product  marketing 
characterised by the grant of a right to use a copy of a computer program, for an 
unlimited period, in return for payment of a fee designed to enable the copyright 
holder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic value of the copy 
of the work of which he is the proprietor, the effectiveness of that provision 
would be undermined, since suppliers would merely have to call the contract a 
'licence' rather than a 'sale' in order to circumvent the rule of exhaustion and 
divest it of all scope.
6
  
Thus, the CJEU took the bold step of by-passing the Information Society Directive in favour 
of the newer 2009 Software Directive, and then reinterpreting the 2009 Directive as a lex 
specialis with a new meaning outside the scope of the pre-existing case law and commercial 
practice.  From the face of UsedSoft itself the reasons for this are less than clear. On the one 
hand there is a potentially very narrow reading of the case which suggests that the decision 
hinged upon the fact that the software could be downloaded gratis and that the licence was 
perpetual. As Advocate General Bot observes in para 59 of his opinion, if the term 'sale' 
within the meaning of art 4(2) of Directive 2009/24 were not given a broad interpretation, the 
effectiveness of that provision would be undermined, since suppliers would merely have to 
call the contract a 'licence' rather than a 'sale' in order to circumvent the rule of exhaustion 
and divest it of all scope.  
However, this does not satisfactorily resolve why the CJEU and the Advocate General were 
so certain that it was necessary to find exhaustion in this case in the first place. The answer 
lies in the use of a very telling phrase that they are limiting Oracle's rights in accordance with 
the 'specific subject matter' of the right. It might be useful at this point to refer to an 
observation made by David Keeling on this topic of specific subject matter some time ago: 
As I say, it is a very esoteric concept,… I think the thing that you have got to 
remember is that the Court of Justice drafts its judgements in French. The French 
for "specific subject matter" is objet spécifique, and I think there is a little bit of a 
double meaning in the word objet in French. It can mean, on the one hand, the 
core of essential rights that are granted by a patent or by a trademark, or by some 
other form of intellectual property. But it can have another meaning, a less 
descriptive meaning; it can imply the objective or the purpose of granting an 
exclusive right. I think that the second meaning is evident in the Court's definition 
of the specific subject matter of the patent right because the Court referred to 
rewarding the creative efforts of the inventor. That was the raison d'etre, the 
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objective, the purpose of the patent. This second meaning of the expression objet 
spécifique is of course lost in the English translation.
7
  
This interpretation of broader raison d'etre marries well with the policy goals being pursued 
by the EU and offers a strong counterpoint to a narrow reading of UsedSoft. A reading which 
has been borne out by the subsequent judgement in PC Box. A telling ancillary point, which 
supports the overall thesis of this present paper, is made in this regard by Longdin et al who 
note that: 
“Under the competition laws of many jurisdictions, it is usually irrelevant whether a 
particular software distribution agreement (or provision therein) is conceptualized as a 
sale or a license or called a „service‟ in the agreement. Restrictive terms imposed by a 
distributor may be found anti-competitive and assailable where the distributor enjoys 
a very high degree of market power in the market for the software in question”.8 
 
2: PC Box 
C-355/12 concerns the creation and supply of modchips which allow games not authorised by 
Nintendo to be played upon consoles like the DS and Wii. The plaintiffs contention is that 
this facilitates the playing of pirated versions of their games upon these consoles. The 
question before the court was: 
Must Article 6 of Directive 2001/29/EC be interpreted, including in the light of 
recital 48 in the preamble thereto, as meaning that the protection of technological 
protection measures attaching to copyright-protected works or other subject 
matter may also extend to a system ... 
Should…the national court…adopt criteria in assessing that question which give 
prominence to the particular intended use attributed by the right holder to the 
product in which the protected content is inserted or, in the alternative or in 
addition, criteria of a quantitative nature relating to the extent of the uses under 
comparison, or criteria of a qualitative nature, that is, relating to the nature and 
importance of the uses themselves?
9
 
Commentators have found these questions difficult to dissect but in essence the Italian court 
is asking if the legal protection afforded to technological protection measures tends to permit 
manufacturers to effectively lock devices and what criteria should be relevant when 
considering whether this locking is permissible – i.e. how significant do non-infringing uses 
have to be before they can counterbalance the interests of the copyright holder. 
The CJEU‟s response is frustratingly brief but clearly demonstrates that the CJEU have 
turned their mind toward the competition aspects of this problem because it focuses on 
                                                          
7
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the doctrinal gap?” (2014) 22 International Journal of Law and Information technology 311-333 at 329 
9
Nintendo Co Ltd and Others v PC Box Srl, 9Net Srl Case C-355/12 [2012] OJ C 295 (hereafter PC Box), 
Application available at 
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proportionality of protection in a real market context. On the one hand the Court explicitly 
recognised that the video game and its intrinsic elements, both separately and collectively, 
constituted a protected work. They also acknowledge that the concept of „effective 
technological measures‟ is defined broadly and includes application of an access control or 
protection process, such as encryption, scrambling or other transformation of the work or 
other subject-matter or a copy control mechanism. Such a definition, moreover, complies 
with the principal objective of Directive 2001/29 which, as is apparent from recital 9 thereof, 
is to establish a high level of protection in favour of authors, which is crucial to intellectual 
creation.  Furthermore, Article 6(3) of Directive 2001/29 lends weight to this interpretation, 
treating the objective of the 'technological measures' as being to prevent or to limit acts 
adversely affecting the rights of the holder protected by them. 
On the other hand, however, the copyright protection mechanism can only be used to protect 
against unauthorised acts of reproduction, communication, public offer or distribution, for 
which authorisation from the copyright holder is required. This echoes strongly the language 
of the 'specific subject matter' in UsedSoft because by necessary implication technologies 
which prohibit uses for which the permission of the copyright holder is not required, i.e. 
those which go beyond the 'specific subject matter' of the right, cannot have legally 
enforceable anti-circumvention protection. This clearly suggests that rights holders cannot 
use TPM to enlarge their rights. 
This limitation is further bolstered by the assertion that legal protection must respect the 
principle of proportionality. Furthermore, states were obliged not to prohibit devices or 
activities which had a commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent the 
technical protection for unlawful purposes (again note that circumvention for lawful purposes 
is permitted). It was observed that the scope of legal protection of technical measures must 
not be assessed according to the use of consoles defined by the holder of copyright, but that 
rather it was necessary to examine the purpose of devices provided for the circumvention of 
protection measures, taking account, according to the circumstances at issue, of the use which 
third parties actually made of them.  
It is for the national court to determine whether other measures or measures 
which are not installed in consoles could cause less interference with the 
activities of third parties or limitations to those activities, while still providing 
comparable protection of the rightholder‟s rights. Accordingly, it is relevant to 
take account, inter alia, of the relative costs of different types of technological 
measures, of technological and practical aspects of their implementation, and of a 
comparison of the effectiveness of those different types of technological 
measures as regards the protection of the rightholder‟s rights, that effectiveness 
however not having to be absolute. That court must also examine the purpose of 
devices, products or components, which are capable of circumventing those 
technological measures. In that regard, the evidence of use which third parties 
actually make of them will, in the light of the circumstances at issue, be 
particularly relevant. The national court may, in particular, examine how often 
those devices, products or components are in fact used in disregard of copyright 
and how often they are used for purposes which do not infringe copyright.
10
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Again we see strong echoes of the principles and tests applied in a competition situation as 
shall be explored below. Tellingly, there is little or no precedent for this kind of test in the 
law of copyright. 
2.1: Article 102: Principles and Tests 
In order to examine the resonances between PC Box and Article 102
11
 we will first consider 
the wording of Article 102, then the travaux préparatoire, and finally the opinions and tests 
that it has given rise to. 
The wording of Article 102 is prima facie fairly transparent: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
12
 
Article 102 clearly breaks down into two parts. The first seems to clearly state that abuse of 
dominant position is prohibited and the other part gives a non-exhaustive list of examples of 
what kinds of activities might be viewed as constituting such an abuse. However, one must 
remember that treaty articles, like the sections of statutes, must be read in context with the 
purposes of the document that contains them. This therefore raises some difficult questions in 
terms of Article 102 as we must consider the larger question of what the purpose of EU 
competition law actually is. To summarise the issue briefly (we shall be exploring it further 
below) there are essentially three basic positions: 
1. What might be described as an 'ordoliberal' approach,   the essence of which treats political 
and economic freedoms as inextricably linked and views the goal of competition law as to 
encourage an ideal economy where individual economic freedom is maximised through 
productive efficiency. This naturally leads to a rather ambivalent approach to state 
intervention. On the one hand it very much places a planned economy at the heart of the 
agenda and thus favours state action, but it also recognises that if taken too far that action 
could also become an impediment to market and to individual freedom. In practice this 
approach means that its advocates wanted competition law to have direct effect (allowing 
both structure and planning as well as enabling the greater European whole to police the 
potentially deleterious actions of the individual state) and to be specific and responsive to the 
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 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102 (ex Article 82 TEC), 
2008 O.J. C 115/47 at 89, [hereafter Article 102], available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/fxac08115enc_002.pdf (accessed 05 Aug 2014). 
12
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economic differences between different anti-competitive practices. This approach is often 
(though not necessarily accurately) associated with German economic policy and is broadly 
reflective of the approaches adopted by the German negotiators in the formation of the treaty 
of Rome. It is this model which is broadly said to have prevailed in the drafting of Article 
102.
13
 
2. The second approach, often (again not necessarily accurately) described as the French 
approach, favours the annunciation of relatively broad principles about competition which 
would be applied universally, but crucially gives individual states much broader powers of 
competition management internally. It can be viewed as rather dirigiste in the sense that it 
allows much greater scope for economic manipulation on the part of individual states within 
the broad framework. The broad framework supplied by EU competition law in this 
interpretation should apply the same basic principles to all abusive practices, not adopt a 
differentiated approach.
14
  
3. The final approach, typical of the teleological interpretative methods of the CJEU, views 
that the purpose of all the treaties, their articles and indeed of the whole Union, is the long 
term welfare of EU citizens and thus social welfare is the context in which Article 102 must 
be read. This is a particularly potent idea post-Lisbon. To put it another way, competition law 
is designed to ensure Europe‟s competitiveness globally and its social welfare internally.15 
This allows for creative combinations of the various interpretations of the goals of 
competition law. It is this holistic approach which has bled through into the world of 
copyright in PC Box. 
If one examines the travaux préparatoire one can see that there are elements of both 1 and 2 
in the drafting of Articles 101 and 102. Naturally, every reiteration of the treaties has 
produced new travaux préparatoire. However, in this paper we shall draw on those which 
have significantly focused on competition law rather than the internal market, or the union in 
general. Specifically, we shall consider the period at the inception of the Union and its 
substantial re-imagining at the treaty of Lisbon. Thus, we shall look at; the Schumann 
Declaration
16
 which was influential in the drafting of the ECSC; the Spaak Report
17
 prior to 
the implementation of the Treaty of Rome; and the consideration given to competition law in 
the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty. The idea is to forensically unearth the sources and 
principles at play in the tests ultimately applied in PC Box which are reflective of fears not 
just about market distortion but also long-term social welfare. 
                                                          
13
 DJ Gerber, “Law And The Abuse Of Economic Power In Europe” (1987) 62 Tulane Law Review 85.  
14
 H Schweitzer, ―The History, Interpretation And Underlying Principles Of Section 2 Sherman Act And 
Article 82 EC, in CD Ehlermann and M Marquis (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed 
Approach To Article 82 EC, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 119-163 at 134. 
15
  A Chirita, “Undistorted, Un(fair) Competition, Consumer Welfare and the Interpretation of Article 102 
TFEU” (2010) World Competition Law and Economics Review 33(3): 417-436 
16
 Schumann Declaration - 09 May 1950, available at  http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm (accessed 05 Aug 2014).  
17
 Comité intergouvernemental créé par la conférence de Messine. Rapport des chefs de délégation aux 
ministres des Affaires étrangères. (Bruxelles: Secrétariat, 1956). 135 p. p. x. (hereafter Spaak Report), available 
at http://www.cvce.eu/education/unit-content/-/unit/en/1c8aa583-8ec5-41c4-9ad8-73674ea7f4a7/dee61d43-
7dc3-4383-a3dc-eb1e9f2e78db/Resources#52a08e74-02f5-4912-a667-2ea34b9dcdea_en&overlay [French 
text](accessed 05 Aug 2014). See also (unofficial English translation) http://aei.pitt.edu/995/1/Spaak_report.pdf 
(accessed 05 Aug 2014). 
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2.2: From ECSC to the Treaty of Rome
18
 
Any understanding we may gain of the goals of competition law in the EU must be firmly 
rooted in an understanding of its growth in the Union and its predecessor the European Coal 
and Steel Community.
19
 The Community arose out of the Schumann Declaration, which 
suggested that the production of coal and steel in France and Germany be placed under the 
control of a High Authority with the participation of other European countries, and has served 
as a first step in 'European political federation'.
20
 The Declaration particularly aimed at the 
ending of cartels which sought to exploit national markets and at its heart was the 
rationalization of production. 
 
…the application of a production and investment plan, the establishment of 
compensating machinery for equating prices, and the creation of a restructuring fund 
to facilitate the rationalization of production.
21
 
 
Competition rules were naturally at the heart of this endeavour because, as a later explanatory 
note highlighted, cartels were synonymous with the “…permanent elimination of competition 
resulting in the exploitation of markets by a particular profession.”22 It is therefore clear that 
the basis of the ECSC competition provisions was very much production efficiency but that 
the reason behind it was to fight cartels. 
The same fight against cartels was at the heart of the negotiation behind the Treaty of 
Rome.
23
  The emphasis however was slightly different in that the context was the free global 
trading of goods, where not only did inter-state trade barriers have to be eliminated, but 
private restraints on competition also had to be controlled internationally through the 
establishment of an international trade organization with provisions on competition. 
Furthermore, the 1955 Spaak Report which was a key drafting document for the Treaty of 
Rome explicitly identifies that there is an existing tension between the goals of: 
 Creation and attainment of a common market 
                                                          
18Chiriţă has offered an insightful historical review of the competition rules for those seeking a more detailed 
perspective on this area in A Chiriţă, “A Legal-Historical Review of the EU Competition Rules” (2014) 63.2 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 281-316. 
19
 ECSC was established by the Treaty of Paris and signed in 1951; it came into force on 23 July 1952, but 
expired on 23 July 2002 
20
R Schulze and T Hoeren, Dokumente zum Europäischen Recht: Kartellrecht (bis 1957) Vol. 3 (Berlin etc.: 
Springer, 2000), at 1. 
21 In original French: “…l'application d'un plan de production et d'investissements, l'institution de mécanismes 
de péréquation des prix, la création d'un fonds de reconversion facilitant la rationalisation de la production (du 
charbon et de l'acier)”  Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950, Fondation J Monnet pour l'Europe Lausanne 
(Fondation Monnet) AMG 17/8/61 at 2. 
22
 “A l‟opposé d‟un cartel international tendant à la répartition et à l‟exploitation des marchés nationaux par des 
pratiques restrictives et le maintien de profits élevés, l‟organisation projetée assurera la fusion des marchés et 
l‟expansion de la production” in “Note anti-cartel, jointe à la déclaration du 9 May 1950”, Fondation Monnet 
AMG 17/8/62. Translated as follows: “In contrast to international cartels, which tend to impose restrictive 
practices on distribution and the exploitation of national markets, and to maintain high profits, the organization 
will ensure the fusion of markets and the expansion of production”. Available at http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration (July 2013) accessed (05 Aug 2014). 
23
 R Schulze and T Hoeren, see note 20,  at 150. 
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 Economic strengthening of the individual states after the war and the revival of the 
productivity and competitiveness of Europe and European countries in the global 
market.
24
 
Although the text of the Spaak report was not wholly adopted it remains an important 
reference point in the drafting process and proved to be more influential than the competition 
rules already laid down in the ECSC.
25
 
As the debate around the drafting of the competition provisions follows the dirigiste v ordo-
liberal schism we have briefly outlined above, this left an interpretative hole in the heart of 
Article 102.
26
 As Akman puts it: 
It is unfortunately not possible to identify a coherent and unified approach to the 
standard of harm under Article 102. The legal concept of „abuse‟ is sufficiently 
abstract and capacious to allow multiple conceptions of its goals. Arguably, 
clashing images of the goals of the provision have caused uncertainty about the 
future of the law in this area and this impedes the capacity of European judges 
and administrators to apply the law consistently and effectively.
27
 
Given this vagueness built into the Article much depends on the interpretations favoured by 
the Court itself in building up an authoritative jurisprudence on the area. 
2.3: Key Cases and the Lisbon Treaty 
The case law on Article 102 has consistently emphasised the link between the prohibition of 
abuse of a dominant position as an essential element of the regulation of the internal market 
and as a key method of attaining the goals of the Union in general. So for example in 
Continental Can the Court held that undistorted competition was necessary “to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities”.28 This 
approach was confirmed in Hoffmann- La Roche.
29
  
The prohibitions contained in Articles 85 and 86 must be interpreted and applied 
in the light of Article 3 (f) of the Treaty which provides that the activities of the 
Community shall include the “institution of a system ensuring that competition in 
the Common Market is not distorted” and Article 2 of the Treaty which gives the 
Community the task of promoting “throughout the Community a harmonious 
development of economic activities”. By prohibiting the abuse of a dominant 
position within the market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States, 
Article 86 (102) therefore covers not only abuse which may directly prejudice 
                                                          
24 See the foreword to the Spaak Report (17) for a discussion of its aims. 
25 See H Schweitzer “The History, Interpretation and Underlying principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and 
Article 82EC‟”in C-D Eherlmann and M Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual  2007: A Reformed 
Approach to Article 82 EC (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 119-164, at 129. 
26
See H Schweitzer Ibid, at 130-138. 
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Publishing, 2012)  at 129 -130  
28
 Judgment of the Court of 21 February 1973 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. 
v Commission of the European Communities Case 6-72 (hereafter Continental Can) para 24. 
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consumers but also abuse which indirectly prejudices them by impairing the 
effective competitive structure as envisaged by Article 3 (f) of the Treaty
30
 
However, there has also been a trend in the case law to view competition as an end in and of 
itself. This probably reflects the fact that until the Lisbon Treaty Article 3 EC included 
among the permitted activities of the Community “the establishment of a system of 
undistorted competition” and some cases seem to have elevated the importance of this to the 
point that they equate a permitted activity with an objective. For example in United Brands 
the Court stated: 
Article 86 (102) is an application of the general objective of the activities of the 
community laid down by article 3 (f) of the treaty: the institution of a system 
ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted.
31
 
Furthermore in Michelin v Commission the Court stated that: 
Before the submissions and arguments regarding the assessment of Michelin 
NV's position in relation to its competitors are examined more closely it should 
be recalled, as the Court has repeatedly held, most recently in its judgment of 13 
February 1979 in Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 
461, that Article 86 of the Treaty is an application of the general aim of the 
activities of the Community laid down by Article 3 (f) of the Treaty, namely the 
institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not 
distorted.
32
  
However, the thread of social welfare has not been lost, consider the Courts discussion in 
TeliaSonera: 
In order to answer those questions, it must be observed at the outset that Article 
3(3) TEU states that the European Union is to establish an internal market, which, 
in accordance with Protocol No 27 on the internal market and competition, 
annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 2010 C 83, p. 309), is to include a system 
ensuring that competition is not distorted. 
Article 102 TFEU is one of the competition rules referred to in Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU which are necessary for the functioning of that internal market. 
The function of those rules is precisely to prevent competition from being 
distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and 
consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the European Union (see, to that 
effect, Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, paragraph 42).
33
 
Given these conflations it is perhaps not surprising that the Treaty of Lisbon removed 
competition form the explicit activities of the Union whilst still asserting that a legislative 
base for competition type actions still exists because of the internal market objective. 
Furthermore, against this complex backdrop of complimentary and competing goals, the 
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Court has adopted a pragmatic approach refusing to create a definition in principle of what 
market distortion or a competitive structure would actually entail. Instead they have grounded 
their reasoning in concrete case examples resolved in the context of the Treaties.
34
 Thus we 
shall finally turn to the practical tests used to determine abuse dominant position that the 
Court has adopted to unite these diverse objectives. It is here that the Courts findings in PC 
Box will make most sense. One simply needs to read the case as raising both issues of 
potential abuse of position by a powerful market player and a long term social welfare 
question. The potent competition of these ideas combined with a more limited approach to 
copyright, as illustrated by UsedSoft, makes the opinion seem not only clear but predictable.  
2.4: Key Tests
35
 
2.4.1: Proportionality 
Proportionality is recognised as cornerstone of the framework for testing for abuse under 
Article 102 in both the case law and the official guidance. However, once again we have a 
slight difference between the two. A clear statement of the case law approach can be found in 
British Airways: 
Assessment of the economic justification for a system of discounts or bonuses 
established by an undertaking in a dominant position is to be made on the basis of 
the whole of the circumstances of the case (see, to that effect, Michelin, 
paragraph 73). It has to be determined whether the exclusionary effect arising 
from such a system, which is disadvantageous for competition, may be 
counterbalanced, or outweighed, by advantages in terms of efficiency which also 
benefit the consumer. If the exclusionary effect of that system bears no relation to 
advantages for the market and consumers, or if it goes beyond what is necessary 
in order to attain those advantages, that system must be regarded as an abuse.
36
 
This resembles the test for breach of fundamental freedoms and can be broken down as 
follows: 
1. Is there conduct giving rise to a prima facie competitive harm? 
2. If there is such a prima facie competitive harm then five sub issues must be 
considered: 
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a. Does the conduct produce efficiencies (or pursues some other legitimate 
objective)? 
b. Is it a suitable method for achieving that objective? 
c. Is it the least restrictive means of achieving the objective? 
d. Do the benefits of the restriction for BOTH producers and consumers 
outweigh the potential competitive harm? 
e. Does the conduct benefit consumers? 
It is clear from this that the court must engage in a balancing exercise. This seems to mirror 
fairly precisely what occurred in PC Box. Even if one considers the slightly altered version of 
the proportionality test in the Commission‟s guidance on Article 102, the same general 
framework applies. In fact it is slightly stricter than the British Airways test because in 
addition it adds a requirement that the conduct not eliminate effective competition.
37
 The case 
law goes on to consider the sub-issues raised by this test, however, we shall focus on two in 
particular due to their relevance here to the idea of the need to maintain “effective 
competition” and the notion of the special responsibilities of a dominant undertaking. 
2.4.2: Effective competition and the special responsibilities of a dominant undertaking 
It should be noted that effective competition is a transparent concept - it is not a philosophical 
or economic idealisation of what competition should be like - it is simply what the name 
suggests; workable actual competition. The clearest description of the concept can be found 
in Metro I: 
The requirement contained in Articles 3 and 85 of the EEC Treaty that 
competition shall not be distorted implies the existence on the market of workable 
competition, that is to say the degree of competition necessary to ensure the 
observance of the basic requirements and the attainment of the objectives of the 
Treaty, in particular the creation of a single market achieving conditions similar 
to those of a domestic market. 
In accordance with this requirement the nature and intensiveness of competition 
may vary to an extent dictated by the products or services in question and the 
economic structure of the relevant market sectors.
38
 
If the specific subject matter of Nintendo‟s copyright had been exceeded i.e. if all 
circumventions of their rights management technologies had been prohibited then this would 
have effectively extinguished any effective competition in that particular field. 
Furthermore, we must consider the special responsibilities placed upon a dominant 
undertaking to avoid actions which would distort competition. This is an important concept 
because it recognises that an undertaking may be dominant in its market for perfectly 
legitimate reasons, but once in that position it has a special responsibility to preserve genuine 
competition. This was clearly outlined in Michelin. 
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A finding that an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a 
recrimination but simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has 
such a dominant position, the undertaking concerned has a special responsibility 
not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the 
common market.
39
 
This clearly places a duty on major players not to engage in distorting activities. In the United 
States this issue with regard to DRM has been resolved by developing a nascent right of fair 
access.
40
 No such provision exists in EU copyright therefore the CJEU has adopted a 
teleological approach and imported concepts and tests from competition law an action it may 
feel justified in taking when the overarching aim of promoting the internal market is 
considered. The difficulty with this approach however is that since many of the concepts are 
not clearly expounded there is a risk that future cases may not fully comprehend or develop 
these lines of reasoning, relying instead on more technical approaches to the application or 
distinguishing of previous cases. 
The potential for the longevity of these developments leads us to the discussion of our final 
case Grund. 
3: Grund and the future  
The Grund case in many senses raised a substantially similar question to PC Box in that it 
concerned the application of the 'technological protection measures'. This time the case 
related not to specific work or other subject matter but to a computer programme. Grund and 
Others (C-458/13) asks: 
Does Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2001/29/EC (1) preclude the application of a 
provision (in this case Paragraph 95a(3) of the UrhG [Gesetz über Urheberrecht 
und verwandte Schutzrechte, Law on copyright and related rights] which 
transposes Article 6(2) of Directive 2001/29/EC into national law if the 
technological measure in question protects not only works or other subject-matter 
but also computer programs?
41
 
This is a rather important question since it raises the issue of how to legally classify video 
games within the EU, in terms of copyright and technological protection measures, and 
whether the Software Directive or the InfoSoc Directive should be applied is not clear cut 
since parts of a video game can fall within the scope of both directives.  
The primary appellant was Anders Grund as administrator in the insolvency proceedings of 
SR-tronic GmbH and the respondent was Nintendo Co. Ltd, Nintendo of America Inc. The 
premise was that the two directives are clearly separate and article 1(2)(a) of the InfoSoc 
Directive states that “this Directive shall leave intact and shall in no way affect existing 
Community provisions relating (a) to the legal protection of computer programs” and that 
subsequently article 6(2) of the InfoSoc Directive does not affect article 7 of the Software 
Directive as both provisions concern TPMs. Hence, the issue which arose for the referring 
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court (the German Supreme Court) was: should TPMs protecting hybrid products, in 
particular video games, fall within either the scope of regulation specifically for computer 
programs or the general provisions of copyrighted works within the InfoSoc Directive? In 
reasserting the applicability of the UsedSoft line of cases in PC Box, however, the CJEU sides 
steps this question by reasserting the concept of lex specialis.  
The Grund reference was withdrawn post PC Box. Prima facie this sends positive signals for 
the acceptance of the CJEUs approach. The question remains, however, how long will their 
complex and nuanced approach be tenable without an explicit statement of the underlying 
principle?  
  
 
Conclusion? 
The principles and ideas inherent in the judgements of this triptych of cases have a strong 
place in the heart of the CJEU‟s thinking on the internal market as a whole, but their links to 
copyright are perilously nebulous. Whilst this teleological approach may allow this line of 
reasoning to flourish within the case law of the CJEU itself, the use of devices like the lex 
specialis or reliance on doctrines which have complex and unclear provenance, will render 
the application of these cases in domestic law problematic. This is particularly the case as the 
burden of determining the nature of the market situation has been left to national authorities. 
We have already seen hints of this with UsedSoft with many legal actors trying to limit its 
application. For example in the German case of Valve v VZVB: 
In the reasons for judgement published now, the court makes it clear that the 
Steam service is not comparable to the situation that the ECJ had to assess in 
UsedSoft. In that case, a company purported to be selling only software licenses, 
which the ECJ permitted with its extensive application of the doctrine of 
exhaustion. But it also clearly stated that even this extensive interpretation did not 
apply to any services connected to the software, such as support or maintenance 
agreements. The Berlin judges consider the Steam service to contain a host of 
such additional services, such as matchmaking, provision of updates, and the 
operation of servers for the very multiplayer experience itself.  
The court even goes beyond this reasoning, which, by itself, would have been 
enough to dismiss VZVB's lawsuit. It also strongly hints that it does not consider 
the UsedSoft extension of the doctrine of exhaustion to intangible copies 
applicable to computer games at all.
42
 
If the CJEU is to take copyright in this new direction then it must make its reasoning more 
transparent. 
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